NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 32 | Number 4

Article 13

6-1-1954

Torts -- Libel and Slander -- Liability of Law
Enforcement Officers for Defamation Contained in
Official Communications
Joseph G. Dail Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Joseph G. Dail Jr., Torts -- Libel and Slander -- Liability of Law Enforcement Officers for Defamation Contained in Official Communications,
32 N.C. L. Rev. 564 (1954).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol32/iss4/13

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

be noted ai this point. It was held there that the retention of the power
to terminate by the decedent would not subject the trust to the estate
tax, if the trust indenture specified that the trust could be terminated
only with the consent of all the beneficiaries. Justice Roberts speaking
for the majority said: "The general rule is that all parties in interest
may terminate the trust.'5 The clause in question added nothing to the
rights which the law conferred. Congress cannot tax as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the death of the
settlor a trust created in a state whose law permits all the beneficiaries
to terminate the trust."'1 The Treasury Regulations are now in accord
with this holding.' 7 Thus, if Lober had not included the power to terminate the trust it would not have been subjected to the estate tax, as
under the applicable state law the settlor of a trust can terminate the
trust if he obtains the consent of all parties in interest.18 And, practically
speaking, he would still have the same control, as it can be fairly assumed
that the consent of the sole beneficiary would be easily obtainable.
The Lober decision, thus, seems to be penalizing the less tax conscious settlor. While the fact that the consent of the beneficiaries would
be a substantial power where there are contingent beneficiaries who
would hesitate in giving away their possibility in the trust, the same
would not be true where there was only a single beneficiary who held
the whole fee in the trust property. It would therefore seem that the
Supreme Court should be concerned with "technical vesting of titles
and estates," despite what was said in the principal case.
JOHN

G. HUTCHENS

Torts-Libel and Slander-Liability of Law Enforcement Officers for
Defamation Contained in Official Communications
One of the many problems arising to confront those engaged in the
enforcement of the criminal law is that of the liability of law enforcing
officers for libel and slander contained in their reports to superiors and
in their communications with other officers.
For example, an investigating officer can often put into his reports
not only statements of fact, but also much in the nature of inference,
conclusions, surmise, etc., which he is able to draw from his observations,
evaluated in the light of his own training and experience. Such things
might be characterized as "policeman's hunches." It goes without say" In so holding the
10

Court cited the

RESTATEMENT, TRusTs §§ 337, 338 (1935).

Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93, 97 (1935).

" U. S. TREAs. PEG. 105, § 81.20 (b) (3) (1939).
" N. Y. PEts PROP. LAW § 23; N. Y. REAL PRop. Law § 118; McEvoy v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 274 N. Y. 27, 8 N. E. 2d 265 (1937).

See also N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-6, 39-6.1 (1950) for the comparable North
Carolina law on this point. It is provided there that the grantor in a voluntary
conveyance may revoke the interest of any person not in esse.
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ing that such material is extremely valuable to other officers, to those
guiding the over-all investigation, and to prosecutors.
A fear of civil liability for defamatory statements of this type has led
to policies in many law enforcement agencies of allowing only statements
of fact to be included in investigative and arrest reports, while matters
of opinion are transmitted orally, or in some instances by inter-agency
memoranda, access to which is closely restricted. The disadvantages
of these methods (particularly the former) from the standpoint of efficiency can readily be seen. In view of the increasing volume and significance of this work, it seems important that some clarification of the
situation be attempted, with the view that the service of these agencies
to the public should not be unnecessarily restricted, and that these officers should know the extent of their protection from civil liability while
engaged in the discharge of their duties.
The law of libel and slander recognizes that statements which would
otherwise be defamatory may be made on certain occasions where the
defamer should be allowed to speak his mind freely in the furtherance
of some important public interest, and it makes the existence of these
occasions defenses to suits for libel and slander. Thus defamatory statements published on such privileged occasions are called "privileged communications." 1 They are of two types: "absolute," and "qualified" or
"conditional."
In cases of absolute privilege, immunity is granted the defamer regardless of the falsity of the communication, his knowledge of that falsity,
or the motives which prompt him to make it. Originally, this privilege
was narrowly restricted to legislative and judicial proceedings and to
reports of military officers to superiors. In more recent years, however,
the courts have extended it to executive officers of the government. The
case of Spalding v. Vilas,2 where absolute immunity was granted a
federal cabinet officer, may be considered as representing the first step
in this direction.3 The privilege has subsequently been extended not
only to heads of executive departments of the government, but also to
inferior officers of such departments when engaged in the discharge of
their duties. 4
I It is helpful to recognize that it is the occasion which is privileged. The communication made on a privileged occasion may not, for reasons discussed below,
always be privileged.
2 161 U. S. 483 (1896) ; Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 196, 88 A. 2d 892,

896 (1952).

Glass v. Ickes, 117 F. 2d 273, 132 A. L. R. 1328 (D. C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied,

311 U. S. 718 (1940) (Secretary of the Interior).
'Farr v. Valentine, 38 App. D. C. 413, Ann. Cas. 1913C, 821 (1912) (Commis-

sioner of Indian Affairs of the Department of the Interior) ; DeArnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. D. C. 167, 5 L. R. A. (NS) 163 (1904), writ of error dismissed,
199 U. S. 616 (1905) (chief of the Record and Pension" Office of the War De-

partment).
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The federal courts seem to be more liberal than most state courts
in extending this absolute privilege. 5 Where the communication was
made to a superior officer, the privilege has been granted by federal
courts to a consul,0 a naval officer 1 and an internal revenue agent.8
Some state courts have also extended the unqualified privilege rather
far. 9 Two cases in which such a privilege was granted to communications passing between law enforcement officers engaged in investigating
a crime are Stivers v. Allen,' ° and Catron v. Jasper. " ' Unfortunately,
some state courts have carried the privilege to unwarranted extremes. 12
The recent case of Matson v. Margiotti'8 is an example of the abuses
Note, 33 ILL. L. REY. 358 (1938).
1United States to Use of Parravicino v. Brunswick, 69 F. 2d 383 (D. C. Cir.
1934).
Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. Md. 1933), Note, 12 N. C. L. Rsv. 170
(1934).
'Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (W. D. Ky. 1938). Considerations
against affording protection to officers for false and malicious statements are outweighed by an "imperative public policy that perfect freedom in the discharge of
public duties is essential to the maintenance of efficient public service and must be
preserved without restraint." Id. at 573.
' E.g., Powers v. Vaughn, 312 Mich. 297, 20 N. W. 2d 196 (1945) (officials of
health department).
'0 115 Wash. 136, 196 Pac. 663 (1921).
11303 Ky. 598, 198 S. W. 2d 322 (1946). The court regarded an absolute
privilege as "essential for the enforcement of the . . . law...." Id. at 604, 198
S. W. 2d at 325.
" In Donner v. Francis, 255 Ill.
App. 409 (1930), one defendant was the officer
in charge of a U. S. Veterans' Hospital; the other was plaintiff's immediate superior. The court said: "All communications, either verbal or written, passing
between public officials pertaining to their duties and in the conduct of public business are of necessity absolutely privileged and such matters cannot be made the
basis of recovery in a suit at law." (emphasis added) Id. at 413. In Haskell V.
Perkins, 165 I1. App. 144 (1911), defendant, plaintiff's superior, filed charges
against plaintiff with a board of education, their employer. However, each of the
foregoing decisions might be explained by remarks of the courts that the proceedings therein were in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings. Absolute immunity
was granted to private citizens who petitioned the Board of County Commissioners
for revocation of plaintiff's liquor license in Lininger v. Knight, 123 Colo. 213, 226
P. 2d
809 (1951).and communications
Proceedings
of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial agencies
are sometimes granted absolute privilege, as extensions of that given to legislative
and judicial proceedings. McAlister & Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S.W. 88
(1926) (real estate commission) ; Stafney v. Standard Oil Co., 71 N. D. 170, 299
N. W. 582, 136 A. L. R. 535 (1941) (Workmens' Compensation Bureau); Bigelow
v. Brumley, 138 Ohio St. 574, 37 N. E. 2d 584 (1941) (commission appointed by
legislature to prepare and circulate official arguments on proposed constitutional
amendment).
19371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952).
There a letter was sent, having been
released to the press prior to its sending, by a state attorney general to a district
attorney concerning alleged communistic activities of a member of the latter's staff
and demanding her dismissal. In a three-to-two decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held both the letter and its release to the press absolutely privileged. Defendant did not plead truth, admitting that plaintiff had been cleared of such
charges by a county bar association. The dissenting judges also pointed out that
there was no official duty requiring defendant to make such publications. Id. at
212, 88 A. 2d at 902. This decision has been widely criticized by legal writers.
See, e.g., Note, 37 MINN. L. Ray. 141 (1953).
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possible when unqualified immunity is granted, even to high executive
officers.
Absolute privilege, on the one hand, is given to those whose positions
or duties are such that they should be completely free to act as they
choose, without even the harassment of having to defend against litigations by proving their good intentions. Necessarily, this means that
they must be protected from litigation even if their motives are bad.
On the other hand, there is the consideration of the right of citizens to
be free from unredressable injuries to their reputations, a right which
it is the fundamental aim and purpose of the law of libel and slander to
protect. Thus the question is one of balance between two conflicting
public interests. It would seem that absolute immunity from liability
for defamatory publications should be as narrowly restricted as pos4
sible.1
In the nature of a compromise between the two extremes is the doctrine of "qualified" or "conditional" privilege, where the interest protected is deemed not to be of such importance that the immunity is absolute, but it is of sufficient importance that immunity is given, conditioned
upon proper purpose and good faith. Conditional immunity is granted
in a much wider variety or situations than is absolute immunitysummed up by Baron Parke as those communications "fairly made by
a person in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal
or moral, or in the conduct
of his own affairs, in matters where his in15
terest is concerned."
Communications on any matters in which the public has an interest
are conditionally privileged. Thus public officers, whose 'duties are undoubtedly affected with a public interest, should be protected by at least
a qualified privilege in the discharge of their duties. And it is generally
so held. 16 More specifically, the prevention of crime being a matter of
"'Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878, 30 L. R. A. (NS) 200
(1910) ; Comment, Defamation Immunity for Executive Oflcers, 20 U. OF CnI. L.
Rav. 677, 679 (1953) : "The privilege should be confined to those officials whose

functions are so necessary that individual rights must be subordinated. Society
and the individuals who compose it should not be forced to surrender their rights
in return for relatively unimportant services. For offices of less than paramount
importance a conditional privilege, sustainable in the great majority of cases, is
fully adequate."
" Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. M. & R. 181, 193, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1049 (Ex.
1834). "A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty. ... "
Lord Campbell C J., in Harrison v. Bush, 5 El. & B1. 344, 348, 119 Eng. Rep. 509,

512 (K. B. 1895).

The situations covered by the qualified privilege may be categorized roughly as
those involving (1) protection of the publisher's interest; (2) protection of an
interest of the recipient or a third person; (3) protection of a common interest;
(4) protection of a public interest. PRoSSER, TORTS § 94 (1941) ; RESTATEmEXT,
TORTS
0

§§ 594-598 (1938).

" Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 Ky. 578, 128 S. W. 878, 30 L. R. A. (NS) 200

(1910) (school superintendent); Ranson v. West, 125 Ky. 457, 101 S. W. 885
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public interest, communications otherwise slanderous are protected if
"they are made in good faith in the prosecution of an inquiry regarding
a crime which has been committed and for the purpose of detecting-and
bringing to punishment the criminal. 117 As the conditional privilege is
granted to private citizens on this basis,' 8 it should surely extend to
20
public agencies'9 and to law enforcing officers.
In accordance with the accepted rules of qualified privilege, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina has granted such privilege to defamatory communications, made by private citizens to the proper authorities, charging crime, 21 or charging misconduct of public officials 2 2 and
also to such statements made by private citizens to other interested persons during the course of investigations into crimes. 23 There is no
indication that the North Carolina Court would extend an absolute
privilege to law enforcement and other minor public officers for communications made in the discharge of their duties.2 4
In cases in which the conditional privilege is granted, the defendant,
in order to be protected from liability for his defamation, must not abuse
the privilege. That is to say, there are certain conditions which must
be satisfied in order to claim this qualified immunity. They can be
divided into three somewhat overlapping categories:
(1) there must be no express malice;
(2) there must be a belief of the truth of the communication; and
(1907) ("common school trustees") ; Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 39 Am. Rep.
384 (1880) (superintendent of U. S. Naval Academy) ; Peterson v. Steenerson, 113
Minn. 87, 129 N. W. 147, 31 L. R. A. (NS) 674 (1910) (postmaster); Stevenson
v. Ward, 48 App. Div. 291, 62 N. Y. S. 717 (4th Dep't 1900) (superintendent of
municipal water department).
"' Eames v. Whittaker, 123 Mass. 342, 344 (1877).
"' White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266 (U. S. 1844) ; Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316,
135 N. E. 515 (1922) ; accord, Stewart v. Major, 17 Wash. 238, 49 Pac. 503 (1897).
The desirability of giving absolute immunity to F. B. I. informers was raised in
Foltz v. Moore McCormack Lines, Inc., 189 F. 2d 537 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U. S. 871 (1951). The Court of Appeals, in reversing the district court's
order dismissing the complaint, decided that a qualified immunity was adequate.
" Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 690 (Ct. Claims 1942) (auditors) ; In re Investigating Commission, 16 R. I. 751, 11 Ati. 429 (1887) ; Hollis v.
McCammon, Morris & Pickens, 86 S. W. 2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (auditors).
"' Morton v. Knipe, 128 App. Div. 94, 112 N. Y. S. 451 (2d Dep't 1908) ; City
of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557, 57 S. E. 2d 1, 13 A. L. R. 2d 887 (1949)
cf., Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Wales, 177 Miss. 875, 171 So. 536 (1937).
" Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 200 N. C. 356, 157 S. E. 16 (1931);
Briggs
v. Byrd, 34 N. C. 377 (1851).
2
Alexander v. Vann, 180 N. C. 187, 104 S. E. 360 (1920) ; Logan v. Hodges,
146 N. C. 38, 59 S. E. 349 (1907).
" Hartsfield v. Harvey C. Hines Co., 200 N. C. 356, 157 S. E. 16 (1931) ; Hearn
v. Ostrander, 194 N. C. 753, 140 S. E. 724 (1927); Elmore v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925).
"' But see a dictum in Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C. 578, 580, 101 S. E. 97, 98
(1919) : "The publication was not absolutely privileged, for it was not in the performance of public service, in which case, notwithstanding proof of the falsity of
the charge and actual malice, an action cannot be maintained thereon." (emphasis

added)
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(3) the privilege must not be "exceeded."
First, defendant will lose his qualified privilege if he makes the publication in the wrong state of mind-i.e., if there is "express malice."
The word "malice" has two distinct meanings in the law of -defamation:
(a) "malice implied in law," a presumption of malice which arises in
order to satisfy the technical requirements of the law whenever a defamatory communication is made on an occasion not privileged; and (b)
"express malice," or "malice in fact." When the occasion is qualifiedly
privileged, it is necessary for plaintiff to prove actual malice in order
to recover. It should be noted that the presence of express malice does
not destroy the legal justification or excuse which makes the occasion
privileged, but it means that defendant has forfeited the defense given
25
to him by the occasion because he used it for a wrongful purpose.
There is some confusion in terminology as to exactly what constitutes express malice. It is said that defendant must be actuated by spite
or ill will, "with a design to causelessly or wantonly injure the plaintiff."2 Other courts stress the necessity for good faith.2 7 Mere negligence in making defamatory statements is generally not enough for a
showing of actual malice, 28 but wantonness or recklessness may be.2 9
Nor is proof of the falsity of the communication, unless defendant knew
of it at the time, sufficient evidence to establish malice. 30 Actual malice
can best be epitomized as a wrong or unjustifiable motive.3 '
The American Law Institute, in its Restatement of Torts, discards
the concept of "malice" as unsatisfactory and substitutes the requirement
that 'defendant must "act for the purpose of protecting the
particular in32
terest for the protection of which the privilege is given."
"'Note, 10 NEB. L. BULL. 193 (1931).
§ 277, p. 315 (4th ed. 1924) ; Elmore v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. R., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925) ; Bell v. Bank of Abbeville,
208 S. C. 490, 38 S.E. 2d 641 (1946).
"'Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 203 N. W. 974 (1925);
Lawless v. Muller, 99 N. J.L. 9, 12, 123 Atl. 104, 105 (1923) ("The fundamental
test is the bona fides of the communication.").
.8 Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515 (1922) ; Peeples v. State, 179
211
NEWELL, SLANDER AND LIBEL

Misc. 272, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 690 (Ct. Claims 1942).

- Elms v. Crane, 118 Me. 261, 107 Atl. 852 (1919).
"Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C. 578, 101 S. E. 97 (1919) ; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109
N. C. 270, 13 S.E. 775 (1891).
"' Stevenson v. Northington, 204 N. C. 690, 169 S. E. 622 (1933); Riley v.
Stone, 174 N. C. 588, 94 S.E. 434 (1917) ; Krug v. Pitass, 162 N. Y. 154, 56 N. E.
526, 76 Am. St. Rep. 317 (1900); Hallen, Character of Belief Necessary for the
Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 ILL. L. REv. 865, 865-6 (1931).

The malice does not have to be against plaintiff personally, but can be indirect.
Stevenson v. Northington, supra; Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N. C. 402, 38 S.E. 931
(1901).
"RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 603

(1938). Under this test, the existence of ill
will

would not be an abuse of the privileged occasion as long as defendant acted to protect or further the privileged interest; conversely, if he did not act to protect that
interest, the privilege could be abused even though there was no ill will or spite.
See Elms v. Crane, 118 Me. 261, 107 AtI. 852 (1919), illustrating this proposition.
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At any rate, it is generally held that the burden of proving actual
malice is on the plaintiff,33 that it is a question for the jury,3 4 and that
it may be determined from all the circumstances surrounding the com35
munication.
The second condition necessary in order for defendant to claim the
protection of the privileged occasion is that he believe his communication
to be true. Some courts hold that the test is whether defendant honestly
believed his statement to be true.3 6 Other courts, however, apply a
negligence standard--i.e., that defendant must have had reasonable
37
grounds or probable cause for believing his communication true.
The third general requirement is that there not be what may be called
an "excess of privilege. 38s Such an excess might be found, for example,
if the communication were not within the scope of defendant's official
duties,30 if the statements were irrelevant,40 if undue publicity were
"Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Yount, 69 F. 2d 700 (8th Cir. 1933);
Parker v. Edwards, 222 N. C. 75, 21 S. E. 2d 876 (1942) ; Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C.
588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917).
" Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917).
" "Malice may be proved by extrinsic evidence of personal ill feeling, or by
intrinsic evidence such as the exaggerated language of the libel, the character of
the language used . . . , the mode and extent of publication, and other matters in
excess of the privilege." Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 231, 203
N. W. 974, 976 (1925) ; Bell v. Bank of Abbeville, 208 S. C. 490, 38 S. E. 2d 641
(1946).
" Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn. 293, 70 Ati. 1035 (1908) ; Harrison v. Garrett,
132 N. C. 172, 43 S. E. 594 (1903) ; Joseph v. Baars, 142 Wis. 390, 125 N. W. 913
(1910) ; Clark v. Molyneux [1877] 3 Q. B. D. 237, 47 L. 3. Q. B. 230, 14 Cox.,
C. C. 10.
However, it is doubtful if even an honest belief will protect statements made
recklessly. Joseph v. Baars, supra.
"Lafferty v. Houlihan, 81 N. H. 67, 121 Atl. 92 (1923) ; cf., Elms v. Crane,
118 Me. 261, 107 Atl. 852 (1919); Hollis v. McCammon, Morris & Pickens, 86
S. W. 2d 652 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ("evidence rendering probable that the auditor
was sincere in the report").
The courts often add such requirements, possibly without intending to mean
anything more than a bona fide belief of truth. Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 322,
135 N. E. 515, 517 (1922) ; Lewis v. Carr, 178 N. C. 578, 580, 101 S. E. 97, 98
(1919) ; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C. 270, 274, 13 S. E. 775, 776 (1891).
Defendant can rely on hearsay and rumor if he communicates them as such and
"for what they are worth." Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 323, 135 N. E. 515, 517
(1922).
"0This expression is sometimes used to mean the existence of express malice.
As the term is used here, however, it means those things which take the communication outside the privilege as a matter of law. "Whether defendant abused or
exceeded the privilege of the occasion is . . . a question of law to be determined
by the court." Swearingen v. Parkersburg Sentinel Co., 125 W. Va. 731, 743, 26
S. E. 2d 209, 215 (1943) ; Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N. C. 106, 52 S. E. 249 (1905).
These same factors, on the other hand, might also be considered by the jury as
evidence of express malice. See note 35 supra.
"Hale Co. v. Lea, 191 Cal. 202, 215 Pac. 900 (1923) ; Stanley v. Prince, 118
Me. 360, 108 Atl. 328 (1919) ; Jacobs v. Herlands, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 711 (Sup. Ct.
1940), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 823, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 770 (2d Dep't 1940) ; cf., Elmore
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 189 N. C. 658, 127 S. E. 710 (1925).
,0Bohlinger v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 100 Ark. 477, 140 S. W. 257 (1911);
Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§605 (1938).
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given to the communication, 4 1 or if improper or abusive language were
42
used.
Some conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing: (1) It is very
doubtful that the North Carolina Court and most other courts would
extend the absolute privilege to ordinary law enforcement and investigative officers. Such a privilege probably should not be extended. (2) It
may be stated with certainty that a qualified privilege is available to
such officers in the bona fide discharge of their duties (since it is available to private citizens under similar circumstances), and that adequate
protection will be afforded them by the qualified privilege. (3) As long
as the defamatory communication is not made from some feeling of personal ill will, and is made as a reasonable man would make it under the
circumstances-that is, with a reasonable belief of its truth, without
abusive language, and without undue publicity-there is little doubt but
that the officer will be immune from liability for that communication.
'x

JosEPH G. DAIL, JR.
Colpoys v. Gates, 118 F. 2d 16 (D. C. Cir. 1940) ; Fields v. Bynum, 156 N. C.

413, 72 S. E. 449 (1911).
12 Ordinarily, violent language used in the communication would be evidence of
express malice for the jury. See note 35 supra. The only question for the court
to decide is whether there is sufficient evidence of malice to go to the jury. The
North Carolina Supreme Court's standard here is "not to give the language of
privileged communications too strict a scrutiny.

'To hold all excess beyond the

absolute exigency of the occasion to be evidence of malice, would, in effect, greatly
limit, if not altogether defeat, that protection which the law throws over privileged
communications.'" Gattis v. Kilgo, 128 N. C. 402, 412, 38 S. E. 931, 935 (1901).

THE NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASSOCIATION
This year for the first time in its long and illustrious history the
North Carolina Bar Association launched a full-scale program of public
relations activities designed to emphasize the value of preventive law to
the people of North Carolina. While much lies ahead to be accomplished
in this field, the achievements this year under the leadership of President
William L. Thorp and committees of the Association afford a solid
foundation for effective expansion of this program.
Last November the first step in the enlarged program was taken by
the employment of a full-time Executive Secretary. He is Charles W.
Daniel, native of Wake County, a former newsman, an A.B. graduate
of Carolina and a recent law* graduate of Wake Forest. The Association
established new headquarters in the Capital Club Building in Raleigh.
During the winter months the Association sponsored a state-wide
series of weekly radio broadcasts over thirty-one radio stations. The
programs, panel-style, were on broad, general legal topics and were well
received. It is expected that a new round of radio programs will begin
next Fall.
In April the Association inaugurated a series of news columns on
general legal subjects in the weekly and daily press on the state. Dr.
Robert E. Lee, of the Wake Forest Law Faculty, is author of the articles
appearing in the daily papers. Secretary Daniel and Attorneys William
Joslin, Thomas F. Adams, Jr. and Ferd L. Davis collaborate in providing articles for the weekly press.
Under the able and effective leadership of J. Spencer Bell, head of
the Association's Continuing Legal Education Committee, two excellent
institutes have been held to date this year, both at Chapel Hill. The first,
in January, dealt with the subject of Small Business Loans and Financing. The second, in March, dealt with three subjects: Estates and Trusts,
Federal Rules of Discovery, and Workmen's Compensation. A Tax
Institute is being planned by Chairman Leon Rice and his committee to
be held during the summer. All continuing legal education activities
are conducted by the Association in cooperation with the law schools of
Carolina, Duke and Wake Forest.
The Association is cooperating fully with the North Carolina State
Bar Incorporated in order to advance the administration of justice and
eliminate unauthorized practice of law.
During the year the Association introduced a pocket-sized periodical
designated "Bar Notes," containing articles, notes and items of interest
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to the Bar generally. The first two issues appeared in January and
May, 1954, and were edited by Secretary Daniel.
Other features of the Association's activities include: a legal aid
program under the direction of the Association's Legal Aid Committee,
headed by Dr. John S. Bradway, of Duke University, in cooperation
with the state and county welfare departments; and the work of the
Association's Committee on Legislation and Law Reform with respect
to legislation to be reported to the Association for recommendation to
the General Assembly.
Officers of the Association for the current year are: William L.
Thorp, president; Chief Justice M. V. Barnhill, Carroll W. Weathers,
and John Manning, vice-presidents; Edward L. Cannon, secretary;
Robert H. Frazier, chairman, James K. Dorsett, Jr., Sam B. Underwood,
Jr., Joel B. Adams, J. B. Swails, A. W. Kennon, Jr., executive committee, with Messrs. Thorp, Bell and Cannon, ex officio members of the
committee.
CARROLL W. WEATHERS

Vice-President

